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A SYMPATHETIC VEHICLE: MICHIGAN V.
KA TT AND SETTING DANGEROUS

PRECEDENT
I. INTRODUCTION

One may imagine that the person seated behind the defendant's
table depends on certain notions of justice. Such notions may
include the right to remain silent, the right to an attorney, to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty, or perhaps most importantly,
the right to a fair trial. Therefore, it comes as quite a surprise when a
court is willing to sacrifice justice through the interpretation of one
small rule of evidence. Whether the charge is petty theft, tax fraud,
or child molestation, a defendant must be able to believe that justice
will be served in a fair and equitable manner. This Comment
provides an example of a case in which the wheels of justice ground
to a halt and took a few turns backward.
In Michigan v. Katt,' the Supreme Court of Michigan held that
the "residual exception" of the Michigan Rules of Evidence
("MRE") could be used to admit statements that were similar to, but
not admissible under, the categorical hearsay exceptions.2 The
residual exception is a tool incorporated into the rules of evidence
that serves to admit certain types of statements into evidence even if
there is no specific provision listed. The Court rejected the
defendant and dissent's position that the "near-miss" theory and the
language of the exception barred similar evidence from being
admitted.
In ruling this way, the Court followed the relatively recent trend
of federal and state courts and set precedent that may allow evidence
that "nearly misses" a categorical hearsay exception to be admitted

1. People v. Katt, 639 N.W.2d 815 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001).
2. Id. at 821. For a succinct summary of this and other relevant evidence
rules, see chart infra pages 1391-92.
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under the residual exception. 3 Categorical exceptions are those
which are specifically listed in the rules of evidence. The court's
interpretation of the residual exception leaves the door wide open for
the admission of evidence that fails to conform to any other
categorical rule. This broad interpretation of the language could
compromise the defendant's right to an equitable trial.
This Comment argues that, even where public policy appears to
necessitate it, courts are creating dangerous precedent by allowing
evidence in through a broad interpretation of the residual exception.
In Katt, the evidence clearly met the indicia of trustworthiness
requirement of the residual exception.4 If the court were to interpret
the rule as the dissent and the defendant did, however, it would never
have considered the evidence under the residual exception to begin
with. The testimony at issue in this case clearly satisfied MRE
803A, the "tender years rule." 5 Thus the court reached outside of the
categorical exception when it admitted the evidence under the
residual exception.
Section II of this Comment presents the pertinent background
facts of Katt presented at the trial and appellate levels. Section III
provides a summary of the Michigan Supreme Court's decision.
Section IV analyzes the ruling, while pointing out the weaknesses
inherent in the court's reasoning. Section V predicts possible
implications of the court's decision, and Section VI concludes.
II. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE FACTS

In 2001, the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's
contention that the admission of hearsay evidence under the residual
exception was erroneous. 6 More specifically, it held that although
the evidence did not fit under the categorical hearsay exceptions, it
was admissible because it possessed equivalent circumstantial

3. People v. Katt, 662 N.W.2d 12, 17-18 (Mich. 2003) (because the
language of MRE 803(24) mirrors its federal counterpart, Federal Rule of
Evidence 807, the Michigan Court of Appeals looked to federal precedent for
guidance regarding this theory).

4. Id. at 25.
5. See infra, note 12.
6. Katt, 639 N.W.2d at 819.

Spring 2004]

RESIDUAL EXCEPTION

1375

guarantees of trustworthiness to render it reliable under the residual
exception.7
The case arose as a result of sexual assaults against a sevenyear-old boy, D.D., and his five-year-old sister, A.D., by the
defendant, Terry Katt. In the autumn of 1998, Terry Katt rented a
room in the home the children shared with their mother, her exhusband and another individual.8 In October of 1998, Angela
Bowman, a child protective services specialist with the Family
Independence Agency visited D.D. at his elementary school after the
Agency received an anonymous phone call alleging 9that D.D. and his
sister were being physically abused by their mother.
Although Miss Bowman did not find sufficient evidence of
physical abuse, D.D. told her that "Uncle Terry" was doing "nasty
stuff' to him.' 0 Miss Bowman further testified that after asking D.D.
what he meant by nasty stuff, he was initially guarded, but then told
her the details of sexual acts that Katt would perform on the children,
or force them to perform on him.ll
The defendant objected to the admission of Miss Bowman's
testimony as to what D.D. had told her about the abuse, claiming that
because it did not fit under the tender years rule in MRE 803A, 12 it
could not be admitted under the residual hearsay exception. 3 D.D.'s
statement to Miss Bowman did not qualify for the tender years rule
7. Id. at 823.
8. Id. at 816-17.
9.Id.
at 817.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. MICH. R. EVID. 803A. The tender years rule provides in pertinent part:
A statement describing an incident that included a sexual act
performed with or on the declarant by the defendant or an accomplice
is admissible to the extent that itcorroborates testimony given by the
declarant during the same proceeding, provided: (1) the declarant was
under the age of ten when the statement was made; (2) the statement is
shown to have been spontaneous and without indication of
manufacture; (3) either the declarant made the statement immediately
after the incident or any delay is excusable as having been caused by
fear or other equally effective circumstance; and (4) the statement is
introduced through the testimony of someone other than the declarant.
Ifthe declarant made more than one corroborative statement about the
incident, only the first is admissible under this rule.
MICH. R. EVID. 803A.

13. Katt, 639 N.W.2d at 818.
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because it was not his first corroborative statement about the abuse,
thus his testimony to the Agency "nearly missed" the categorical
exception. 14 As such, the trial court and appellate court admitted the
testimony under MRE 803(24), the residual exception, because the
statement was deemed to have the "equivalent circumstantial
5
guarantees of trustworthiness."'
According to the defendant, Miss Bowman's testimony
regarding the sexual abuse was "specifically covered" by MRE
803A, and thus could not be admitted under the residual hearsay
exception.' 6 At least one court has characterized this argument as the
near-miss theory, meaning that a hearsay statement that is close to,
but that does not completely satisfy a recognized hearsay exception
is not admissible under the residual hearsay exception. 17 The
Michigan court adopted the federal majority interpretation of the
rule, holding that if a hearsay statement is inadmissible under one of
the established exceptions to the hearsay rule, it is not automatically
removed from consideration under MRE 803 (24).18
The Michigan Court of Appeals, embracing the majority of
federal circuits, interpreted "specifically covered" to mean that "'if a
statement is admissible under one of the hearsay exceptions, that
' 19
exception should be relied on instead of the residual exception."
14. Id.
15. MICH. R. EvID. 803(24) (listing"Other Exceptions"):

A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is
offered as evidence of a material fact, (B) the statement is more
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence
that the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts, and (C) the
general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be
served by admission of the statement into evidence..
MICH. R. EVID. 803(24) (emphasis added).
16. Katt, 639 N.W.2d at 819.

17. United States v. Deeb, 13 F.3d 1532, 1536 (11 th Cir. 1994).
18. People v. Katt, 662 N.W.2d 12, 21 (Mich. 2003).

19. Katt, 639 N.W.2d at 820 (quoting 5 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A.
Berger, Weinstein's FederalEvidence, §807.03(4) (2d ed. 2000)). See, e.g.,
United States v. Earles, 113 F.3d 796, 800 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting the majority
of circuit courts have held language "specifically covered" to mean "only that
if a statement is admissible under one of the prior exceptions, such prior
subsection should be relied upon" instead of the residual exception); United
States v. Clarke, 2 F.3d 81, 83 (4th Cir. 1993) (court recognized that a liberal

Spring 2004]

RESIDUAL EXCEPTION

1377

However, the court recognized that not all courts have interpreted the
rule's language in the same manner. 20 In footnote nine of the
opinion, the court highlighted a few minor cases which read the
exception to exclude evidence that did not meet the requirements of a
categorical hearsay exception, such that the evidence was not
admissible under the residual exception. 2 1 The Michigan Court of
Appeals adopted the federal majority interpretation of the rule,
holding that if a hearsay statement is inadmissible under one of the
established exceptions to the hearsay rule, it is not automatically
removed from consideration under MRE 803(24) (the residual
22
exception rule).
The Michigan Court of Appeals then rejected the defendant's
next argument, which challenged the fit of the testimony under MRE
803(24).23 The defendant maintained that (1) the evidence did not
possess equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and
(2) it was not more probative on the point for which it was offered
than any other evidence that the prosecutor could have procured
through reasonable efforts. 24 The court disagreed, and held that in
reviewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
testimony, the evidence did comport with the factors set forth by
federal and state precedent to determine trustworthiness.2 5
Therefore, in applying the state and federal precedent to the
testimony of Miss Bowman as to what D.D. had told her, the lower
courts found the evidence to be trustworthy, and thus admissible
under the residual exception. For example, Miss Bowman did not
interpretation of "specifically covered" is consistent with the underlying
purpose of the residual hearsay exception).
20. Katt, 639 N.W.2d at 819-21.
21. Id. at 821 n.9 (citing United States v. Turner, 104 F.3d 217, 221 (8th
Cir. 1997) and Schimpf v. Gerald, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 976, 985 (E.D. Wisc.
1999)).
22. Katt, 639 N.W.2d at 821.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.; see e.g., People v. Lee, 622 N.W.2d 71, 80 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000)
(naming the trustworthiness factors as, among others, "1) the spontaneity of the
statements; 2) the consistency of the statements... ; 3) lack of motive to
fabricate or lack of bias...; 6) personal knowledge of the declarant about the
matter on which he spoke... ; 7) to whom the statements were made."); Idaho
v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822 (1990) (noting the "unifying principle is that
these factors relate to whether the child declarant was particularly likely to be
telling the truth when the statement was made").
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ask D.D. about sexual abuse. 26 Rather she was there to examine him
for physical abuse.27 Yet D.D. spontaneously spoke up about the
"nasty stuff' that Katt was doing to him.28 Further, the court did not
believe that D.D. was coached by anyone to "mouth sentences to
Miss Bowman that were not true." 29 The court also considered Miss
Bowman's qualifications in interviewing children about abuse, and
found that she was fully capable of obtaining reliable information
from the child.3 ° In addition, the court found nothing to suggest that
D.D. had a motive to fabricate the information he relayed to Miss
Bowman. 31 Overall, Miss Bowman's testimony contained the
trustworthiness guarantees that MRE 803(24) required.32
The defendant also argued that the testimony of Miss Bowman
was not more probative than other evidence the prosecutor could
have brought. 33 Katt contended that the potential testimony of
D.D.'s mother on the subject was more probative because D.D.
allegedly told her about the sexual abuse a few days before his
conversation with Miss Bowman. 34 The trial court rejected this
argument and the Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that Miss
Bowman's testimony was more probative both because the
information was much less detailed, and because it was factually
unclear what had been said to the mother regarding the abuse.35
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's rejection of each
of the defendant's claims of error regarding the admission of
evidence and also affirmed the defendant's convictions.
The
defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Michigan.
III. SUMMARY OF THE DECISION

In review, the Supreme Court of Michigan identified the issue of
whether Miss Bowman's testimony was properly admitted as a
question of law, and the Court reviewed the lower court's decision de
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Katt, 639 N.W.2d at 822.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 822-23.
Id. at 823.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 824.
Id.

35. Id. at 824-25.
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novo. 36 The Supreme Court of Michigan concluded that the trial
court properly admitted the hearsay statements under MRE 803(24),
37
and accordingly affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
A. MRE 803(24) and the Near-Miss Theory
In affirming the decision of the lower courts that Miss
Bowman's testimony was admissible under MRE 803(24), the
residual exception, the Supreme Court of Michigan examined the
language specifically covered within the context of the near-miss
theory. The theory is part of the debate concerning the interpretation
of the words "specifically covered" and the admissibility of evidence
to a categorical hearsay exception, but not
that is factually similar
38
admissible under it.
The court explained the theory as stating, "'that a piece of
hearsay evidence may be offered only under the exception that most
nearly describes it. If it is excluded under that exception, it may not
be offered under the residual exceptions.' 39 Citing the interpretation
of Judge Easterbrook in his concurring opinion in United States v.
Dent,40 the court reasoned that MRE 803(24):
Reads more naturally if we understand the introductory
clause to mean that evidence of a kind specifically
addressed ("covered") by one of the [categorical
exceptions] must satisfy the conditions laid down for its
admission, and that other kinds of evidence not covered
(because the drafters could not be exhaustive) are
admissible if the evidence is approximately as reliable as
evidence that would be admissible under the [categorical
exceptions] .4"
Judge Easterbrook's opinion advocates the position that if the
evidence is of the particular type addressed by one of the rules, it
must either satisfy the conditions for admission or be inadmissible.
36. People v. Katt, 662 N.W.2d 12, 17 (2003) (holding that a trial court's
decision to admit evidence is reversed).

37. Id. at 14.
38. Id. at 18.
39. Id. (quoting In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238,
302 (3d Cir. 1983)).
40. United States v. Dent, 984 F.2d 1453 (7th Cir. 1993).
41. Katt, 662 N.W.2d at 18 (quoting Dent, 984 F.2d at 1465-66).
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The Michigan Supreme Court also agreed that statutory construction
controls interpretation. For example, the court cited Morton v.
Mancari,42 which stated that it was 'a basic principle of statutory
construction that a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and
specific subject is not submerged
3 by a later enacted statute covering
a more generalized spectrum."A
Armed with a definition of the near-miss theory, 44 the court
determined that a strict application of the theory would preclude too
much evidence, rendering the residual exception unavailable under
any circumstances.45 The court concluded that even the few courts in
the nation that have adopted the rule have also softened its
application. 46 In this case, the hearsay exceptions apply to a
relatively broad category of evidence, therefore applying the nearmiss theory would negate the application of the residual exception.47
Thus, the court rejected the application of the near-miss theory
to Miss Bowman's testimony. The court adhered to an interpretation
of "specifically covered" that is directly contrary to those courts that
The court interpreted the
adhere to the near-miss theory.
introduction of MRE 803(24) to mean, "[a] statement not admissible
under the categorical exceptions would not be 'specifically covered'
be a candidate for admissibility
by those exceptions, and thus' could
8
under the residual exceptions. A
The Michigan Supreme Court also held that its interpretation
was in accord with the majority of federal circuits. 49 The view of the
Fourth Circuit is much the same: "[t]o adopt the 'near-miss' theory
would create an odd situation where testimony that was equally
trustworthy would be distinguishable based merely on its proximity

42. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
43. Katt, 662 N.W.2d at 19 (quoting Morton, 417 U.S. at 550-51).
44. The court reasoned that the near-miss theory was based on a broad

reading of the term "specifically covered," and that under such a theory, a
party could never use the residual exception to admit evidence if there was

already a categorical exception to which it was related. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.; see, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,505 F.
Supp. 1190 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
47. Katt, 662 N.W.2d at 19.

48. Id. at 20.
49. Id. at21.
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to a specified exception." 50 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also
declined to adopt a narrow view of FRE 807 and held, "this court
interprets Fed. R. Evid. 807, along with the majority of circuits, to
mean that 'if a statement is admissible under one of the hearsay
exceptions, that exception should be relied on instead of the residual
exception. ' 51
B. The Michigan Supreme Court'sApproach to the
Residual Exception
In its review of the admissibility of Miss Bowman's testimony
under the residual exception, the Michigan Supreme Court relied
upon the dictionary definition of "covered" in order to better explain
the meaning of specifically covered. 52 The court read the two words
together, according to the normally understood meaning, and
concluded, 53that "specifically covered" requires more than to be

"covered.

Therefore, the court interpreted the language in this way:
Since "specific" can mean "conformable to specific
requirements" and "cover" can mean "addressing" or
"dealing with," we understand that a statement is only
"specifically covered" by a categorical exception when it is
conformable to all the requirements of that categorical
exception. To hold otherwise would read "specifically" out
of the rule.54
The court's position was that if the evidence conforms to all the
conditions of the exception, then it is specifically covered.
The court also rejected the idea that the residual exception
would swallow up the categorical exceptions.55 The court reasoned,
"if a near-miss statement is deficient in one or more requirements of
a categorical exception, those deficiencies must be made up by
alternate indicia of trustworthiness." 56
Therefore, the court
50. Id. at 20 (citing United States v. Clarke, 2 F.3d 81, 83-84 (4th Cir.
1993)).
51. Id. at 20-21 (quoting United States v. Laster, 258 F.3d 525, 530 (6th
Cir. 2001)).
52. Id. at 21.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 23.
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maintained that the residual exception does not automatically admit
just any evidence.57 Whether admitted under the categorical
exceptions or the residual exception, the evidence must still meet
guarantees of trustworthiness, the difference being the actual
conditions. 58 The court affirmed that the residual exception may be
used to admit evidence that is similar to, but not admissible under,
the categorical exceptions. 59
The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed the lower court's
consideration of factors when determining whether Miss Bowman's
testimony satisfied the elements of MRE 803(24)60 and indicia of
trustworthiness. 6 ' The court also listed additional factors to consider
when looking at the "totality of the circumstances. 62 In general, the
court declared that the admissibility of evidence
under MRE 803(24)
63
must be decided on the facts of each case.
As applied to the case at hand, the court defined specifically
covered to mean "admissible." 64 Since the defendant never
contended that the testimony was admissible under a categorical
exception, the court deemed it a proper candidate for admissibility
under MRE 803(24).6' The Supreme Court of Michigan looked to
the findings of the trial court and affirmed that D.D.'s statement to
Miss Bowman satisfied each element of MRE 803(24).66 In
particular, the trial court elaborated on the trustworthiness of the
statement, finding that it was spontaneous and unanticipated by Miss
Bowman and also the most probative evidence available regarding
the actual abuse.6 7
The defendant argued that the evidence failed to meet the
conditions of MRE 803(24) because D.D.'s statement to Miss
Bowman was not his first corroborative statement concerning the

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id. at 23 n.11.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 22.
Id.

66. Id.
67. Id.
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abuse, alleging that D.D. spoke first to his mother about the abuse.68
However, the trial court found no concrete evidence or facts
concerning D.D.'s conversation with his mother, therefore the court
found that it was impossible to compare the two statements for
probative worth. 69 The court also maintained that D.D.'s second
statement was preferable to later statements he may have made due
to the influence that reactions of listeners may have had.7 °
After considering the circumstances under which D.D. made his
statement to Miss Bowman, the trial court found that it met the first
three elements of the residual exception and that it was not in danger
of compromising the interests of justice, and that it therefore was
admissible under the exception. 7 1 The Michigan Supreme Court
affirmed the results of the trial court, finding that it did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the statement under MRE 803(24).72
IV. ANALYSIS

Although public policy and the indicia of trustworthiness
contained in Miss Bowman's testimony weigh in favor of admission,
the Supreme Court of Michigan did not reach the correct result in
admitting the evidence under MRE 803(24) (the residual exception).
The court's interpretation of MRE 803(24) is of concern, suggesting
that perhaps the court should never have considered evidence under
the exception in the first place.
In the present case, the Michigan Supreme Court made a broad
statement in holding that the residual exception will be used to admit
evidence that is similar to, but not admissible under, another
categorical exception. 73 It is conceivable that the court would make
such a determination due to the heinous nature of child molestation
and abuse, but in choosing to set precedent, the court now has a
broad rule that admits evidence that nearly misses another exception.
Furthermore, while the court should try to stop the sexual abuse of
children, a broad interpretation of the residual exception seems to

68. Id. at 25-26.
69. Id. at 26.
70. Id.
71. Id.

72. Id.
73. Id. at 23.
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suggest that the court will admit hearsay evidence, even if it fails to
satisfy another exception.
Judge Young's dissenting opinion in Katt advocated a
narrower interpretation of the language of MRE 803(24). 74 Judge
Young acknowledged his position as the minority view, but he
reasoned that a broad interpretation of MRE 803(24) goes against the
general prohibition against hearsay, rendering the exceptions and
If interpreted broadly, the residual
restrictions meaningless. 75
exception functions as a:
"Trojan Horse" that has been set upon the judiciary to
wreak havoc and to emasculate the rule against hearsay.
Advocates for the exception, like the fated inhabitants of
ancient Troy, erroneously believed that the exceptions
by adding strict
could be adequately controlled
76
requirements for admission.
In other words, Judge Young questions what the point is of having a
rule against hearsay if such a wide range of evidence will get in
through an exception providing for the admission of the leftovers.
Judge Young also noted that drafters of the rules provided the
residual exception for the consideration of "new and presently
trustworthiness within
unanticipatedsituations which demonstrate a 77
According to Judge
the spirit of the specifically stated exceptions.
Young, D.D.'s statement to Miss Bowman did not constitute a "new
andpresently unanticipatedsituation," due to the fact that this sort of
for under MRE 803A and failed to meet the
testimony was provided
78
admission.
criteria for
The majority, on the other hand, read the language of the
residual exception more broadly so as to admit D.D.'s testimony due
to the factors of trustworthiness surrounding the statement. Although
the testimony was trustworthy, the court erred in admitting the
evidence under MRE 803(24) because MRE 803A specifically
covered the evidence and would have served to admit it had all of the
74. Id. at 26.

75. Id. at 27-28.
76. Id. at 28 n.5 (quoting James E. Beaver, The Residual Hearsay
Exception Reconsidered, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 787, 794-95 (1993)).
77. Id. at 28 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 803(24) advisory committee's note, 56
F.R.D. 183, 320 (1973) (emphasis added).

78. Id.
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elements been met. The language of the residual exception should be
interpreted narrowly so that it does not include all evidence that just
misses another exception.
The court found that D.D.'s statement to Miss Bowman satisfied
the elements of trustworthiness, 79 yet it is questionable whether the
court should have considered the statement under the residual
exception at all. MRE 803A provides the circumstances under which
80
a statement regarding the sexual abuse of a child may be admitted
and seems to be inclusive of the "anticipated" situations where a
child may report instances of abuse.
The dissent and proponents of the near-miss theory would argue
that MRE 803A, the tender years rule, covered Miss Bowman's
testimony concerning D.D.'s report of abuse. 81 As applied to D.D.'s
statement, MRE 803A is the most relevant exception. For example
D.D. was under the age of ten when he made the statement
describing the sexual acts that Katt allegedly performed on him, the
trial court found that the statement was spontaneous, the statement
was made soon after the abuse occurred, and the statement was
introduced through the testimony of Miss Bowman, rather than D.D.
The only condition of MRE 803A that the testimony does not satisfy
is that it be the first corroborative statement regarding the abuse.
Unfortunately, the testimony failed to meet all the elements of 803A,
but that does not mean that it should have been considered under
another exception.
Although the testimony failed under MRE 803A, there may have
been other probative evidence that the court could have admitted
instead. D.D. may have told his uncle or his mother about the abuse
first, leaving other avenues open to introduce the evidence. Also,
D.D.'s own testimony would have been most useful. Not only could
he have described the abuse again, but it is also possible that he
could have corroborated his exchange with Miss Bowman and Miss
Bowman's testimony would not have been needed at all. The
Supreme Court of Michigan rushed forward to apply MRE 803(24)
and ended up setting precedent that interpreted the language of the
exception so broadly that every bit of evidence could be given a
second try.
79. Id. at 26.
80. MICH. R. EVID. 803A.
81. Katt, 662 N.W.2d at 18-19.
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Judge Young noted that when a court construes a rule, it applies
the legal principles that govern the construction of statutes and thus
starts with the language of the rule itself.82 When the language of the
rule is unambiguous, however, the court will enforce the meaning
83
expressed without further investigation or judicial construction.
According to Judge Young's statutory construction, the
language of MRE 803(24) states: "A statement not specifically
covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness... and the interests of
justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence." 84 Miss Bowman's testimony concerning D.D.'s report of
the abuse according to 803A merely failed because it was not D.D.'s
first corroborative statement of the abuse.
The tender years rule seems to be part of an effort to include
evidence of abuse in situations where the statement was made by a
young child to someone else, without the child being led to make
such a report. Because the rules have become more specific, MRE
803A was the proper avenue for admitting D.D.'s testimony. The
statement would have been admitted had it satisfied all of the
conditions of MRE 803A.
The Michigan Supreme Court interpreted the language of MRE
803(24) too broadly and erred in admitting D.D.'s statement to Miss
Bowman because such testimony comfortably fit under MRE 803A.
The type of testimony at issue in this case, a statement of a young
child regarding sexual abuse, is provided for under the tender years
rule, and D.D.'s testimony simply failed to satisfy one of the
elements. The prosecution had other options for admitting the
testimony, and having D.D. testify as to his conversation with Miss
Bowman would have been most logical.
V. SETTING DANGEROUS PRECEDENT: FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF A
BROAD RESIDUAL EXCEPTION

Katt is a sympathetic case, yet the holding of the Supreme Court
of Michigan is troubling. As previously stated, too broad an
interpretation of MRE 803(24) may provide all hearsay evidence that
82. Id. at 28 (Young, J., dissenting).
83. Id. (Young, J., dissenting).
84. MICH. R. Evm. 803(24).
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fails an element of a categorical exception with a second chance. It
is likely that a majority of such evidence satisfies the guarantees of
trustworthiness. As a result, the court has created an open door for
hearsay evidence that nearly misses an exception.
Where does the court draw the line? Judge Young expressed
concern about the effort this ruling will have on the common law rule
against hearsay "'a rule which may be esteemed, next to jury trial,
the greatest contribution of that eminently practical legal system to
the world's methods of procedure."' 85 The holding of Katt seems to
suggest that in all cases where evidence fails under a categorical
exception, yet satisfies indicia of trustworthiness, it will be admitted.
Unless the court restricts the application of this precedent and
narrows its interpretation in future cases, the days of equitable trials
may start to dwindle.
For example, in People v. Wilson8 6 the trial court admitted
hearsay testimony under the catch-all exception (same as residual
exception).87 The defendant in that case was convicted of felony
murder, premeditated murder and various counts of arson.88 The
testimony at issue was that of several witnesses to whom the victim
allegedly spoke of her fear of her son (the defendant). 89 Although
the trial court found substantial basis and sufficient guarantees for a
few of the statements, primarily those of police officers, the court
nevertheless admitted a statement from the defendant's aunt without
examining or justifying its trustworthiness.9"
On
review, the
91
Michigan Court of Appeals called the error harmless.
The Michigan Supreme Court held the Wilson application for
appeal was suspended pending the decision of Katt.92 Once Katt was
decided, the court denied appeal and Judge Young dissented in
85. Katt, 662 N.W.2d at 27 (citing 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE
ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE § 1364 (Chadbourn Rev.
1974)).
86. People v. Wilson, No. 220559, 2001 WL 1167527, at *2 (Mich. Ct.
App. Oct. 2, 2001).
87. Id. at *2-*4. Also note that the "residual exception," formerly MRE

803(24), was moved to MRE 804(b)(7) after a 2001 amendment. MICH. R.
EviD.804(b)(7).
88. Wilson, 2001 WL 1167527, at *1.
89. Id. at *1-*2.
90. Id. at *4.
91. Id.
92. People v. Wilson, 668 N.W.2d 901, 901 (Mich. 2003).
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Wilson and again voiced his concern about a broad residual
exception. 93 He stated:
[T]he prohibition against the admission of hearsay evidence
is necessary to "maintain the integrity of witness
testimony." And this prohibition is utterly eroded when-as
in this case-testimony inadmissible under the enumerated
the catchexceptions to the hearsay rule is admitted under
94
hearsay.
against
prohibition
the
to
all exception
If hearsay testimony that does not satisfy any exception is
admitted into evidence, the purpose and intent of the Rules of
Evidence will be compromised.
In Wilson, Judge Young's dissent cites the trial court's transcript
in order to point out the dangers that the Michigan Supreme Court's
ruling in Katt created. There, the prosecutor, in an attempt to admit
the testimony of the defendant's aunt, argued that it was needed
because, "'[m]other's (sic) don't call and make police reports on
their sons saying that he's going to kill us if we don't give him
money. ' 95 The trial court admitted the testimony after hearing this
vague argument and stated:'
I'm going to admit [the testimony]... As I said, we make
the record. That's all I can do. In fact, as far as I'm
concerned, this is an exception to the Hearsay Rule, and it
is probative of some issue that is up to be proved by the
Prosecutor. So,... I think under the circumstances, it is
admissible.96
This is troubling because the court did not explain the
"circumstances" or the guarantees of trustworthiness that made it
admissible. Judge Young noted that while the Katt court was
confident that the equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness would
keep the catch-all exception under control, it is just an analysis as
this that renders such a test meaningless. 97 Judge Young admonished
the majority for missing their opportunity to explain how the residual
exception could function in the interest ofjustice.

93. Id. (Young, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 901 (Young, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).

95. Id. at 902 (Young, J., dissenting) (quoting the trial court's transcript).
96. Id. (Young, J., dissenting) (quoting the trial court's transcript).
97. Id.
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As the Wilson ruling shows, the Katt decision may have had the
effect of loosening the bolts that hold the hearsay doctrine together.
A similar trend is evident in the federal system. For example, in
United States v. Laster, the Sixth Circuit admitted evidence under the
residual (i.e. catch-all) exception of Federal Rule of Evidence 807
that failed to satisfy the conditions of the business records exception
of Fed. R. Evid. 803(6).98 Laster dealt with a record of sale for a
chemical used in manufacturing methamphetamine. The evidence in
this case did not satisfy the business records exception because the
government agent testifying to the sale was not familiar with the
seller's record keeping system. 99 In a dissenting opinion, Judge
Moore contended that the evidence was improperly 00
admitted under
the residual exception and cited the near-miss theory.1
Judge Moore disagreed with the majority approach to the
residual exception. She called it the "close-enough" theory, meaning
that if the evidence is close enough to a categorical exception, the
residual exception will cover it.10 She stated, "Such an approach
makes little sense given the listing of explicit hearsay exceptions in
Rule 803 ...[an] exception that the drafters of the residual exception
thought sufficient to cover anticipated... hearsay situations."' 1 2 In
Laster, the court admitted the records under the residual exception
when the evidence failed to meet the low threshold required for the
business exception.103 Judge Moore also did not believe that the
majority found the proper guarantees of trustworthiness under the
residual exception and stated:
The majority's holding thus appears to make it unnecessary
ever to call a sponsoring witness to establish the
admissibility of business records, at least so long as there is
"'no indication' that the records [are] not reliable." This
cannot be squared with the language of Rule 803(6), which
requires "the testimony of the custodian [of the records] or
other qualified witness" to vouch for the existence of the
other elements of the business records exception. Nor is it
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

United States v. Laster, 258 F.3d 525, 530 (6th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 529.
Id. at 534 (Moore, J., dissenting).
Id. (Moore, J., dissenting).
Id. (Moore, J., dissenting).
103. Id. (Moore, J., dissenting).
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clear how, as a general matter, business records introduced
without the testimony of a qualified sponsoring witness can
be said to have "circumstantial
guarantees of
trustworthiness" equivalent to those that exist when a
qualified sponsoring witness
testifies to the trustworthiness
1°4
question.
in
records
of the
The majority in Laster admitted evidence under the residual
exception when it was clear that the evidence fell under a categorical
exception, but failed to satisfy the elements required for admission.
The admission of evidence that doesn't fit a categorical
exception under the residual exception is questionable due to the
language of the exception itself, but also because of the public policy
concerns in particular factual situations. In Katt, it was in the public
interest to admit the testimony of Miss Bowman concerning her
interview with D.D. about the sexual abuse, but there is still the
concern that doing somay compromise the system. If both the state
and federal courts only apply this precedent in accord with the facts
of this case, i.e., cases involving the sexual abuse of a child, the rule
may be justified. However, it would be in the best interests of both
the drafters of the Michigan Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules
of Evidence to meet to define the meaning of those two little words
"specifically comes" in MRE 803(24), before things get dangerously
out of control.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Michigan Supreme Court erred in its admission of Miss
Bowman's testimony under the residual exception of MRE 803(24).
The broad interpretation of the words "specifically covered" renders
the categorical exception useless in restricting hearsay when
trustworthy evidence may get in anyway under MRE 803(24).
D.D.'s testimony was trustworthy, but the court should not
automatically deem it admissible based upon that alone. The judicial
system has created many specific ways for evidence to be admitted,
and when the courts interpret the residual exception too broadly,
there does not seem to be a need for specific exceptions at all.
The courts must seize the opportunity to explain the language, to
settle the controversy once and for all. It would be in the best
104. Id. at 534-35 (Moore, J., dissenting).

Spring 2004]

RESIDUAL EXCEPTION

1391

interest of justice to define the residual exception narrowly and
create an exception that only deals with those situations that the
drafters did not dream of. A court should come forward soon to
explain how the residual exception can be used without infringing on
the procedural and substantive rights of defendants.
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE AND MICHIGAN RULES OF EVIDENCE
USED IN THIS COMMENT

Michigan Rule of Evidence
803A
The Tender Years Rule

A prior statement made by a child
describing a sexual act performed
with or on him by the defendant is
admissible if it is the first
corroborative statement made by the
child and
1. the child was under the age of ten
when the statement was made;
2. the statement is shown to have
been spontaneous;
3. the child made the statement
immediately after the incident or
delayed because of fear;
4. the statement is introduced through
the testimony of someone other than
the declarant.

Michigan Rule of Evidence
803(24)
The Residual Exception

A statement not specifically covered
by any other exception, but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness, meaning:
(A) the statement is offered as
evidence of a material fact,
(B) is more probative on the point for
which it is offered than any other
evidence that the proponent can
offer, and
(C) the interests of justice are best
served by the admission of the
statement.

Federal Rule of Evidence
Federal Rule of Evidence

Same as 803(24) and have to make
1

aeas832)

n
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807
The Catch-all Exception
Federal Rule of Evidence
803(6)
The Business Records Exception

the proffered evidence available to
the proponent in advance.
The following are not excluded by
the hearsay rule, even though the
a
as
is available
declarant
witness: ... (6) Records of Regularly
Conducted Activity.
1. A memorandum, report, record, or
data compilation, in any form,
2. of acts, events, conditions,
opinions, or diagnoses,
3. made at or near the time by a
person with knowledge
4. kept in the course of regularly
conducted business,
5. testimony must be by the custodian
of records.
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